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Higher unemployment increases the cost of job loss and heightens employees’ feelings 
of job insecurity. The paper argues that these two effects could have a positive influence 
on employee organizational commitment. Using data from the Household, Income and 
Labor Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) microdata database, we find that employees in 
high unemployment regions are more committed to their organization, while the effect of 
unemployment on employee’s commitment is stronger in the private sector.   
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1    Introduction 
Organizational commitment and its link to productivity and organizational performance have 
been widely researched in the extant literature. Organizational commitment has been 
associated with superior employee job performance (Meyer et al., 2002), high customer 
satisfaction (Dale and Fox, 2008) and lower turnover and absenteeism (Allen and Meyer, 
1996). Committed employees interact with colleagues to improve working relations and they 
play an active role in promoting organizational goals (Kleine and Weiβenberger, 2014). Many 
studies have also used organizational commitment as an indicator of leadership effectiveness 
and researchers have made considerable efforts to identify its main antecedents (Podsakoff et 
al., 1996; Walumbwa and Lawler, 2003; Dale and Fox, 2008; Fulmer and Gelfand, 2012). 
The bulk of the literature on the antecedents of commitment has focused on job demands, 
i.e. job characteristics that require employees’ physical and psychological efforts, and on 
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characteristics that are valuable job resources, including supervisory support, career 
advancement, task variety, role clarity, and participation in decision making (Demerouti et al., 
2001; Bakker et al., 2010). Among these characteristics, job autonomy and opportunities to 
participate in decision-making processes have attracted considerable attention in the literature 
as two of the most influential drivers in improving levels of organizational commitment 
(Brockner et al., 2004; De Guyper and De Witte, 2006; Mauno et al., 2007). Studies have also 
explored how various negative job demands can have a detrimental effect on organizational 
commitment. Low levels of organizational commitment have been linked to job insecurity 
(Sverke et al., 2002; Cheng and Chan, 2008), work-family conflict (Byron, 2005), increased 
workload (Bakker et al., 2010). Research has also explored the importance of organizational 
culture as an antecedent of organizational commitment, showing that the set of values and 
behavioral norms embodied in organizational culture, such as trust, fairness, and teamwork, 
have a positive effect on organizational commitment (Ostroff et al., 2005). 
Compared to the extensive evidence on organization-based antecedents of organizational 
commitment, there is a paucity of evidence on the role of macroeconomic conditions in 
shaping employees’ levels of commitment. The goal of this study, therefore, is to shed new 
light on whether macro-economic factors, such as unemployment rates, could influence the 
employees’ level of organizational commitment, beyond the influence of individual 
characteristics or the influence of the immediate work environment. We argue that in areas of 
high unemployment, employees are likely to exhibit higher levels of commitment, because of 
the higher penalty of job loss, which strengthens the incentive for them to adopt a more 
disciplined attitude towards their employing organization. The study is undertaken for the 
case of Australia over the time span 2011-2014. The author argues that the structure of labor 
markets in Australia (i.e., strong unskilled workforce with great emphasis on part-time and 
causal jobs, especially for the youth workforce), along with the adverse economic growth 
conditions over the 2013-2014 period will provide solid evidence on whether sudden 
unemployment rates can impact loyalty commitments in the manufacturing sector of the 
country. 
We can trace the notion of unemployment as an employee discipline device back to 
Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), who theorized that, under certain conditions, unemployment 
becomes an effective tool for extracting maximum worker effort, without the need for costly 
workplace monitoring or supervision. The Shapiro-Stiglitz thesis on the role of 
unemployment as an important driver behind employee attitudes and workplace behaviors is 
particularly relevant in the context of employee commitment.  Its non-coercive nature, as a 
psychological state that allows employees to feel loyal to their organization, precludes the use 
of direct monitoring as a means of improving organizational commitment.  Alternatively, 
higher levels of organizational commitment in areas of high unemployment could be 
explained by a sense of gratitude that employees feel towards their organization for having 
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offered them a sought after opportunity for gainful employment. In such a social exchange 
type of relational setting, it is also plausible that the external threat of high unemployment, 
which could potentially threaten the organization’s own existence, might actually galvanize 
employees to becoming more loyal towards their organization. Yet, higher aggregate 
unemployment during an economic downturn could heighten feelings of job insecurity among 
employees, with a detrimental effect on their level of commitment to the organization. 
Admittedly, evidence suggests that employees who experienced the layoffs of fellow 
employees, but themselves survived a layoff, had their perceptions about their organization 
and their levels of commitment negatively affected (Brockner et al., 2004). In this study, we 
test whether unemployment has a positive effect on organizational commitment using data 
directly from the HILDA Survey. 
2    Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
Meyer and Allen (1991) have proposed a conceptualization of organizational commitment 
based on three main dimensions: (1) continuance commitment, associated with the costs of 
leaving the organization; (2) normative commitment, when employees feel an obligation to 
stay with the organization; and (3) affective commitment, focusing on employees’ emotional 
attachment to and identification with the organization. All three dimensions encompass a 
notion of commitment as a psychological state characterizing employees’ relationship with 
the organization and influencing their intentions to leave or to remain (Meyer et al., 1993; 
Powell and Meyer, 2004). Admittedly, this conceptualization of commitment as merely a 
psychological state has been debated in the literature, with many researchers arguing that 
organizational commitment is more of an array of workplace attitudes and it is better defined 
by a set of observable workplace behaviors (Klein et al., 2012). Nevertheless, the above, 
three-dimensional conceptualization still provides a useful framework for exploring how 
aggregate unemployment influences each of three dimensions of organizational commitment. 
Employees with a strong sense of continuance commitment are aware of the costs 
associated with leaving their organization. Exit costs include the loss of seniority benefits, 
which employees have accumulated over their tenure with the current employer, the potential 
loss of health insurance coverage due to pre-existing conditions, as well as other direct and 
indirect transaction costs associated with changing employers. Such costs are usually non-
negligible, even when the decision to change employers is voluntary. However, the financial 
and psychic costs associated with involuntary job loss, because of layoffs or dismissals, are 
generally higher than the costs of voluntary job separations. Most often, unemployment is 
associated with a drop in income, with a detrimental effect on living standards, but perhaps 
more importantly, unemployment has a salient negative impact on individuals’ psychological 
well-being, which is all but transitory (Lucas et al., 2004). Indeed, the damaging impact of 





unemployment on individuals’ self-esteem, emotional well-being, and physical health has 
been well documented (McKee et al., 2005). 
A question that has attracted less attention in the literature is how others’ unemployment 
affects the employed. Does an increase in the unemployment rate make the employed feel 
better because they have a secured anyway? Does higher unemployment increase the 
probability of job loss and feelings of job insecurity among employees? Recent studies in the 
subjective well-being literature offer some answers to these questions by confirming the 
existence of a strong link between job insecurity and life satisfaction (Clark et al., 2010). 
Research has also identified a strong link between job insecurity and employees’ workplace 
attitudes, behaviors and commitment. Studies have found, for example, that higher aggregate 
unemployment creates feelings of job insecurity that have a direct effect on employees’ 
organizational commitment (Dekker and Schaufeli, 1995; Sverke et al., 2002; Cheng and 
Chan, 2008).  In a similar vein, Brockner et al. (2004) find that layoffs have a negative impact 
on organizational commitment and job performance of employees in the organization who are 
not affected directly by the layoffs, although this effect is moderated by the level of perceived 
control. Haysknecht et al. (2008) provide empirical evidence supporting the moderating effect 
of local unemployment in the relationship between unit-level satisfaction, commitment, and 
absenteeism. In an earlier study, Markham and McKee (1991) document that high 
unemployment rates inevitably result in employees having fewer opportunities outside their 
current employer, which compel them to reduce absenteeism. In fact, the idea of linking the 
cost of job loss to employee effort, commitment, and workplace behaviors could be traced 
back to the Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) model of unemployment as a worker discipline device. 
Underpinning the Shapiro-Stiglitz model is a utility maximization framework, which 
introduces a macro perspective into the individual, micro-level employee behavior. The 
model states that during periods of low unemployment rates, firms are raising wages, so that 
workers would have more to lose when they are caught shirking. Higher wages increase labor 
costs and they are thus detrimental to employment. In contrast, when unemployment rises 
there is less need for firms to pay higher wages to discourage employee shirking. In this 
sense, unemployment operates as a discipline device for employees not to shirk, eliminating 
the need for employers to offer higher wages or to introduce costly supervision and 
monitoring processes. 
Although the Shapiro-Stiglitz model explains primarily why unemployment occurs in the 
first place, it also describes the behavior of rational workers who choose employment over 
unemployment by simply comparing the value of employment to the value of unemployment. 
How much the current employment is worth is determined by current earnings and by how 
long it is going to last, which depends on the probability of a worker losing her job and 
entering unemployment. When aggregate unemployment is low, or there is no unemployment, 
workers who lose their jobs are rehired instantaneously. In this case, the cost or penalty of job 
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loss for ‘shirkers’ is not severe and therefore the only way for the firm to ensure high levels of 
productivity is to monitor workers with costly supervisory processes and managerial 
structures or to pay them above market wages. In contrast, higher unemployment introduces a 
penalty for workers who are not exerting maximum effort, as it makes it more difficult for 
them to return to employment after redundancy. This increases the value of employment with 
the current employer compared to the value of unemployment. Moreover, a lower probability 
of re-employment increases the duration of unemployment and the associated monetary costs, 
thus reducing further the value of the unemployment state. In this sense, as employees realize 
the potentially sizeable cost of job loss during periods of high unemployment, they have an 
incentive to maintain and cherish their current employment and to remain loyal and 
committed to their organization.   
By emphasizing the potentially high cost of unemployment, the Shapiro-Stiglitz model 
offers an insightful framework for explaining how employees’ continuance commitment 
increases when aggregate unemployment is high. Nevertheless, while the model explains why 
in times of heavy local unemployment, employees work harder to keep their jobs, it does not 
explain whether employees will do so in a state of fear over losing their jobs or because they 
feel emotionally connected with or they have a sense of obligation towards their organization 
(i.e., affective or normative commitment respectively).  Nevertheless, these are plausible 
scenarios, as employees could perceive sluggish economic growth and rising unemployment 
as a threat to the organization that they work for, and not solely as a threat to their own jobs. 
In this case, normative commitment levels will increase as employees feel an obligation to 
exert more effort, which in turn will help their organization to survive through a period of 
challenging economic conditions. 
From the above discussion, we derive the main testable hypothesis of the study:  
 
Hypothesis 1:  In high-unemployment regions, employees report higher 
scores of organizational commitment than employees in low-
unemployment areas. 
The effect of unemployment on employee loyalty differs across industries and types of 
organizations. Studies have identified significant differences in employee loyalty across the 
public and private sectors (Zeffane, 1994) and why unemployment affects public and private 
sector employees differently (Luechinger et al., 2010). They highlight differences between 
public and private sector employees in terms of their prosocial and public service motivation, 
i.e. prosocially-motivated employees self-select themselves into public service jobs 
(Georgellis et al., 2011). When confronted with the threat of unemployment, employees in the 
public sector adopt a more prosocial stance and become more loyal to their organization. 
Therefore, we hypothesize that:  
 





Hypothesis 2:  The effect of unemployment on employee loyalty differs 
across different types of organizations and industrial sectors. 
3    Methodology 
The estimation is carried out through a fixed effect methodological approach. The panel 
equation is formed by considering both time and individual effects, except in the case where 
the analysis occurs explicitly for years 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014. In this model, the 
intercept parameter is different for each individual and for each time period (where 
appropriate). The fixed effects model aims at controlling the effect of omitted variables that 
vary between individuals and remain constant over time. To this end, it is assumed that the 
intercept varies from individual to individual, but is constant over time, whereas the response 
parameters (i.e., the estimated coefficients) are constant for all subjects and across all time 
periods. However, to avoid any potential inefficiency effects associated with the estimations 
in the generic model, we make use of a dynamic version of fixed effects estimations, the 
‘pooled mean group’ (PMG) estimators recommended by Pesaran et al. (1999). This estimator 
yields not only consistent, but also considerably more efficient estimates that the static fixed-
effect methodological approach when the slope homogeneity restriction holds. In addition, the 
PMG estimator has two attractive features: i) it allows testing the above restriction via 
standard Hausman-type tests, and ii) it allows both the dynamic specification and error 
variances to differ across individuals, which constitutes a clear benefit since those variances 
may be quite different, reflecting disparities in the way individuals behave in labour markets. 
Finally, a clear benefit of this approach is that it yields consistent estimates of the long-run 
vector no matter whether the variables involved are I(1) or I(0). 
4    Data 
We use linked employer-employee data from the 2011 through the 2014 HILDA database, 
which surveys Australian establishments, covering workplaces with at least five employees. 
The sample is drawn from 427 establishments. It includes 4,695 employees interviewed in 
2011, 4,873 employees in 2012, 5,085 employees in 2013, and 5,258 employees in 2014. 
Respondents are asked whether they agree with the following statements about working life: 
“I feel loyal to my organization”. The responses are coded so that 5 = ‘Strongly agree’, 4 = 
‘Agree’, 3 = ‘Neither agree nor disagree’, 2 = ‘Disagree’, 1 = ‘Strongly disagree’.   
Due to the matched employer–employee nature of the data, they allow us to control for 
both employee- and establishment-level characteristics, when assessing the impact of 
unemployment on organizational commitment. As unemployment rates in 2014, were 
generally higher than in the previous waves, we also perform separate analyses for each wave 
to see whether unemployment matters more for employee commitment when it is more 
severe. In order to explore whether there are any sector differences in the way unemployment 
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affects organizational commitment, we further disaggregate our analysis by type of 
establishment. Unemployment is measured using the Australian Bureau of Statistics 
unemployment for the seven Australian States. In 2013 and 2014, unemployment rates 
increased across all States and differences across regions became more salient than in the 
previous years. Finally, it is worth pointing out that unemployment data for 2010 were also 
obtained on the following grounds (and I thank a referee for mentioning this): given that the 
survey captures the commitment of the employees at a particular point of time, if commitment 
is to be affected by the unemployment rate, then it is also affected by the latest announced 
level of unemployment (at least). Based on the fact that annual data are used, it is the 
unemployment of the previous yearthat does belong to the available information set of the 
individuals interviewed, since statistical authorities announce the unemployment rates at the 
beginning of the next year. As a result, the analysis makes use of the unemployment rate of 
the latest announced unemployment rate, prior to the time that the survey took place. In other 
words, our modeling approach is employing the one-lag unemployment rate in the regression 
analysis. 
Information from HILDA controls for job design, family friendly policies, high 
involvement management practices, and the size of the organization. The view that job design 
drives employee’s loyalty is well established and is measured as a scale based on a latent trait 
model of three dimensions of the jobs of the largest occupation in the workplace (range 1-3): 
variety in the work, discretion over how the work is done, and control over pace at which the 
work is carried out. Higher scores indicate a more enriched job design, with a positive effect 
on employee loyalty. The positive influence of family friendly policies on loyalty is a latent 
score based on responses to questions about whether non-managerial employees are entitled 
to maternity leave, emergency care leave, work at home, term-time only contracts, job-
sharing, workplace nursery, childcare subsidies, financial help to care for elderly relatives, 
and elder care leave (range 1-4). Higher values indicate more family friendly workplaces. 
High involvement management practices are measured by a latent trait model fitted to a set of 
indicators of the availability of the following nine flexible work and high involvement skills 
acquisition practices (Wood and de Menezes, 2008): quality circles, functional flexibility, 
team working, suggestion scheme, induction, interpersonal skills training, team briefing, 
information disclosure, and appraisal. In smaller establishments, interpersonal comparisons 
intensify and levels of loyalty are inextricably linked to the fairness about their relative status 
in comparison to that of their peers (range 1-9). Smaller firms display relational style 
management practices, less investment in workplace training, less collective voice through 
labor unions, and fewer opportunities for skills enhancement and career progression, 
increasing the vulnerability to the threat of unemployment. 
Other controls used include job tenure (0 for no, 1 for yes), supervisory responsibility (0 
for no, 1 for yes), the number of children, gender (1 for males, 0 for females) and age. 





Employee loyalty varies with job tenure and typically follows a U-shape relationship, 
consistent with the Honeymoon Effect hypothesis. Employees with supervisory 
responsibilities exhibit higher levels of loyalty, exemplifying differences in job content, 
autonomy, task variety, and perceived organizational support. The presence of children 
increases work-life balance concerns among working parents. Older workers are more loyal to 
their organizations. Most job changes occur during the early stages of an individual’s career, 
implying that young workers are likely to pursue employment opportunities outside their 
current employer, while during periods of high unemployment, the penalty of job loss is 
higher for the young because of the lack of sufficient experience. Table 1 reports a summary 
of descriptive statics that provide a generic picture of the data sample used to explore the 
hypotheses under study. The Jarque-Bera statistic test suggests that the null hypothesis of 
normality is rejected in the cases of weekly pay, number of employees, high involvement 
management practices and unemployment. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean S.D. Min Max Jarque-
Bera 
Loyalty 3.4 1.93 0.8 4.8 1.29 
Age 41.4 3.99 30 61 1.14 
Gender 0.6 0.24 0 1 1.85 
No. of children 2.2 0.85 0 4.3 2.38 
Job tenure 0.6 0.37 0 1 0.5 
Supervisory   
Responsibility 0.4 0.22 0 1 0.5 
Weekly pay A$544.2 31.28 294.3 773.8 89.15 
No. of employees 36.8 21.94 8 83 125.48 
High involvement   
management practices 4.8 2.83 1 9 14.32 
Family friendly   
policies 2.9 1.16 1 4 1.03 
Job design 1.8 0.75 1 3 0.64 
Unemployment 4.6 2.17 3.2 5.5 19.73 
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5    Empirical Analysis 
Because of the ordinal nature of the dependent variable, we estimate ordered probit 
regressions, with employees’ loyalty being determined by a transformation of the various 
antecedents of loyalty into a cardinal latent index:  
  ( ) iii ezC += '* β     (1) 
where c indicates commitment/loyalty, Zi is a matrix of independent variables, β  is a vector 
of parameters to be estimated and ie  is the error term assuming the usual properties. The 
matrix Z includes the following control variables: age rankings, gender, the number of 
children, job tenure, a measure of supervisory responsibility, weekly pay, the number of 
employees, high involvement in management practices, family friendly policies, job design 




































       (2) 
with iμ  representing the thresholds. 
Table 2 presents that male employees are less likely to report high levels of loyalty than 
female employees, with the estimates remaining relatively constant over the period 2011-
2014. Employee loyalty increases with age throughout the period under study. The highest 
levels of loyalty are reported by older workers in the over 60-age bracket. Employees in the 
20-29-age bracket are less loyal. 
The job tenure coefficients suggest a declining pattern of employee loyalty after the 
second year of tenure and till the fifth year of tenure across all years under study. For years 
2011 and 2012 this pattern remains consistently the same for both the 5 to 10 years and 10 
years or more time brackets. By contrast, for years 2013 and 2014 (the years characterized by 
higher unemployment levels) the loyalty increases for the tenures described by the 5 to 10 
tears and 10 years or more time brackets, indicating that in stressful working times higher 
tenure levels remain (not) surprisingly loyal to their working place. Employees with 
supervisory responsibilities report high levels of loyalty throughout the years under 
 





Table 2: Unemployment and Employee Loyalty 
 Loyal2011 Loyal2012 Loyal 2013 Loyal2014 
     
Male - 0.211** - 0.218** - 0.215** - 0.213** 
Age     
    20-21 - 0.042 - 0.048 - 0.066** - 0.090** 
    22-29 - 0.121** - 0.130** - 0.152** - 0.164** 
    30-39   0.011   0.016   0.015   0.018 
    40-49   0.034   0.041   0.040   0.042 
    50-59   0.085   0.102*   0.138**   0.173** 
    60-64   0.252**   0.268**   0.285**   0.303** 
    65 and above   0.496**   0.509**   0.530**   0.561** 
Number of children - 0.006 - 0.010 - 0.012 - 0.014 
Job Tenure     
     2 to less than 5 years - 0.095** - 0.115** - 0.140** - 0.166** 
     5 to less than 10 years - 0.131** - 0.139**   0.160**   0.174** 
     10 years or more - 0.182** - 0.189**   0.212**   0.230** 
Supervisory responsibility   0.348**   0.367**   0.392**   0.421** 
Weekly Pay   0.000   0.000    0.000    0.000 
Establishment level information        
     Number of employees - 0.010 - 0.013 - 0.011 - 0.014 
     High involvement management - 0.050** - 0.066**    0.072**     0.081**  
     Family friendly policies - 0.046** - 0.058**  - 0.092**  - 0.109**  
     Job design   0.031**   0.039**   0.062**    0.089**  
Unemployment rate(-1)   0.022**   0.024**    0.061**   0.084** 
CD test    [0.00]  [0.00]  [0.00]  [0.00] 
R-squared adjusted    0.69  0.73  0.71  0.75 
Log Likelihood   -1509.83 -1482.64 -1569.06 -1593.29 
Hausman test    [0.41]  [0.45]  [0.39]  [0.49] 
Notes: * p< .05; ** p< .01. Figures in brackets denote p-values. 
investigation, with the coefficients receiving their higher value in years 2013 and 2014. 
Children and weekly pay do not seem to exert any significant impact on employee loyalty.  
High involvement management practices have a negative influence on employee loyalty in 
2011 and 2012, while the impact turns out to be positive over the 2013 and 2014 years. 
Employees in organizations with a greater availability of family-friendly policies report lower 
loyalty scores across all years (Georgellis et al., 2011), while employees in organizations with 
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enriched job designs report higher scores for loyalty, again across all four years under 
examination. Finally, unemployment rates exert a positive effect on loyalty across all years, 
with the strongest impact occurring in the years 2013 and 2014 (0.061 and 0.084, 
respectively) that illustrate the years with increased unemployment rates across the Australian 
labor market. The findings in unemployment support Hypothesis 1. In States with high 
unemployment rates, employees report higher scores of loyalty. This confirms the role of 
unemployment as a potential mechanism influencing feelings of job insecurity and it is 
consistent with the Shapiro-Stiglitz view that unemployment operates as an employee 
discipline device that reduces the need for expensive monitoring. Finally, diagnostic tests 
indicate that the residuals in these models are cross-sectionally dependent, which justifies the 
employment of the PMG estimation approach, while the Hausman test indicates, in all cases, 
that the restriction of homogeneity cannot be rejected at the 1% significance level. Hence, 
once again the PMG estimation is appropriate to explore unemployment commitments. 
Tables 3 to 6 report results separately by type of business and sector. The differential 
effects of weekly pay and the organizational-level variables are notable. The negative effect 
of high involvement management practices on employee loyalty in the public sector, 
local/central government and non-trading public companies is also notable. The findings 
suggest that while unemployment exerts a positive effect on employee loyalty only for those 
working in public and in private limited companies and in years 2011 and 2012, the impact 
turns to gain significance across all sectors in years 2013 and 2014. These results over the 
years 2011 and 2012 offer support to Hypothesis 2 and are consistent with arguments in the 
literature explaining why unemployment affects public and private sector employees 
differently (Luechinger et al., 2010).  
By contrast, over the years 2013 and 2014 where unemployment figures revealed a worst 
employment scenario, the arguments set by Hypothesis 2 are no longer valid. At the same 
time, weekly pay over the years 2013 and 2014 turn out to be statistically insignificant across 
all types of organizations, illustrating that in stressful times employees disregard weekly pay 
as a key driver for their loyalty to their employment environment. Finally, diagnostic tests 
indicate again that the residuals in these models are cross-sectionally dependent, while the 
Hausman test indicates again that in all cases the restriction of homogeneity cannot be 
rejected at the 1% significance level. Overall, the results document that during stressful times, 
a number of factors that could impact employees’ loyalty seem to have been deactivated due 
to higher uncertainty conditions in the economy in general, and in the labor markets in 
particular. 



























Male    -0 .203** -0.182**  -0.080   -0.087  -0.210**  -0.279*    -0.197** 
Age        
    20-21    -0.082 -0.085  0.096*  -0.112* -0.097* -0.109*  -0.000 
    22-29    -0.090 -0.231** -0.110  -0.208** -0.232** -0.035  -0.050 
    30-39     0.311**  0.081  0.048    0.052  0.051  0.066   0.031 
    40-49     0.322**  0.260**  0.141    0.536**  0.044  0.128   0.143 
    50-59     0.321**  0.064  0.210    0.558**  0.018  0.110   0.132 
    60-64     0.137  0.122  0.091    0.252  0.157  0.028   0.147 
    65 and above     0.142  0.165  0.062    0.235*  0.196*  0.081   0.247* 
Number of children    -0.087 -0.031 -0.037   -0.069 -0.041 -0.088  -0.080 
Job Tenure        
    2 to less than 5 years    -0.148  -0.096 -0.110   -0.103 -0.053 -0.085  -0.144* 
    5 to less than 10 years    -0.082  -0.231** -0.094   -0.542** -0.105 -0.122  -0.316** 
    10 years or more     -0.183*  -0.290** -0.142   -0.133 -0.098 -0.477**  -0.294** 
Supervisory responsibility     0.357**   0.381**  0.452**    0.095  0.077  0.286*   0.393** 
Weekly Pay     0.034**   0.028**  0.001    0.080**  0.077**  0.030   0.053* 
Establishment level information        
     Number of employees    -0.000   -0.000 -0.000   -0.049* -0.000 -0.000  -0.000 
     High involvement 
 management practices 
   -0.136*   -0.000 -0.054   -0.032 -0.061 -0.460**  -0.179** 
     Family friendly policies    -0.017   -0.036 -0.042   -0.291** -0.025 -0.022  -0.074* 
     Job design     0.031    0.000  0.074    0.020  0.016  0.000   0.132* 
Unemployment rate(-1)     0.093**    0.075**  0.020    0.015  0.007  0.033   0.012 
CD test     [0.00]    [0.00]     [0.01]       [0.00]     [0.00]  [0.00]   [0.01] 
R-squared adjusted     0.53    0.57  0.50    0.62  0.55  0.59   0.61 
Log Likelihood   -1493.44   -1518.94 -1488.28  -1514.59 -1509.27 -1532.94 -1577.30 
Hausman test     [0.44]    [0.41]  [0.36]   [0.39] [0.52]  [0.49]  [0.54] 
Notes: Similar to Table 1. 
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Male    -0 .191** -0.162**  -0.055   -0.075  -0.198**  -0.254*    -0.181** 
Age        
    20-21    -0.073 -0.075  0.090*  -0.102* -0.087* -0.099*  -0.000 
    22-29    -0.074 -0.207** -0.089  -0.195** -0.214** -0.024  -0.040 
    30-39     0.290**  0.053  0.037    0.042  0.045  0.051   0.024 
    40-49     0.293**  0.241**  0.120    0.511**  0.033  0.110   0.119 
    50-59     0.306**  0.050  0.183    0.528**  0.006  0.081   0.117 
    60-64     0.122  0.101  0.073    0.220  0.124  0.012   0.121 
    65 and above     0.118  0.146  0.045    0.213*  0.180*  0.061   0.225* 
Number of children    -0.062 -0.020 -0.022   -0.041 -0.020 -0.062  -0.055 
Job Tenure        
    2 to less than 5 years    -0.132  -0.081 -0.090   -0.082 -0.030 -0.062  -0.119* 
    5 to less than 10 years    -0.072  -0.208** -0.084   -0.518** -0.091 -0.098  -0.301** 
    10 years or more     -0.172*  -0.263** -0.111   -0.102 -0.085 -0.447**  -0.264** 
Supervisory responsibility     0.334**   0.350**  0.424**    0.082  0.060  0.254*   0.375** 
Weekly Pay     0.043**   0.036**  0.000    0.093**  0.087**  0.050**   0.069** 
Establishment level        
     Number of employees    -0.000   -0.000 -0.000   -0.031 -0.000 -0.000  -0.000 
     High involvement 
i
   -0.125*   -0.000 -0.042   -0.026 -0.054 -0.434**  -0.165** 
     Family friendly policies    -0.011   -0.023 -0.035   -0.254** -0.020 -0.017  -0.067* 
     Job design     0.020    0.000  0.061    0.006  0.007  0.000   0.117* 
Unemployment rate(-1)     0.07**    0.056**  0.007    0.010  0.000  0.012   0.000 
CD test     [0.00]    [0.00]  [0.00]    [0.00]  [0.00]  [0.00]   [0.00] 
R-squared adjusted     0.57    0.55  0.58    0.51  0.56  0.51   0.59 
Log Likelihood   -1439.73  -1472.18 -1455.62  -1469.61 -1452.39 -1549.64 -1588.32 
Hausman tets    [0.36]   [0.39]  [0.35]   [0.42]  [0.39] [0.50]  [0.48] 
Notes: Similar to Table 1. 
 
  



























Male    -0 .132* -0.125*  -0.036   -0.045  -0.171**  -0.214*    -0.150** 
Age        
    20-21    -0.081 -0.090  0.104*  -0.119** -0.107* -0.121**  -0.012 
    22-29    -0.090*** -0.234** -0.110*  -0.226** -0.232** -0.039  -0.052 
    30-39     0.316**  0.068  0.042    0.055  0.060  0.067   0.031 
    40-49     0.314**  0.265**  0.139**    0.477**  0.042  0.125**   0.144** 
    50-59     0.329**  0.057  0.192*    0.557**  0.011  0.102*   0.134*** 
    60-64     0.133  0.121*  0.078***    0.255**  0.114***  0.000   0.131 
    65 and above     0.100  0.130  0.031    0.238**  0.195**  0.048   0.238** 
Number of children    -0.046 -0.011 -0.014   -0.032 -0.015 -0.058  -0.041 
Job Tenure        
    2 to less than 5 years    -0.117  -0.075 -0.080   -0.075 -0.018 -0.051  -0.092*** 
    5 to less than 10 years    -0.065  -0.191** -0.066   -0.449** -0.065 -0.081  -0.279** 
    10 years or more     -0.160*  -0.233** -0.088   -0.081 -0.070 -0.410**  -0.232** 
Supervisory responsibility     0.298**   0.319**  0.381**    0.051  0.045  0.214**   0.331** 
Weekly Pay     0.024   0.016  0.000    0.035  0.036  0.026   0.021 
Establishment level        
     Number of employees    -0.000   -0.000 -0.000   -0.013 -0.000 -0.000  -0.000 
     High involvement    -0.089*   -0.000 -0.000   -0.014 -0.031 -0.134***  -0.061 
     Family friendly policies    -0.000   -0.000 -0.005   -
0 114***
-0.000 -0.000  -0.021 
     Job design     0.003    0.000  0.031    0.000  0.000  0.000   0.060*** 
Unemployment rate(-1)     0.095**    0.080**  0.064*    0.049*  0.057*  0.057*   0.051* 
CD test     [0.00]    [0.00]  [0.00]    [0.00]  [0.00]  [0.00]   [0.00] 
R-squared adjusted     0.59    0.63  0.60    0.58  0.64  0.64   0.68 
Log Likelihood   -1428.71   -1442.66 -14.28.73  -1462.19 -1501.53 -1546.92 -1580.49 
Hausman test    [0.32]    [0.35]  [0.42]    [0.36]  [0.41]  [0.52]   [0.47] 
Notes: Similar to Table 1, *** p< .10 
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Male    -0 .122* -0.108*  -0.024   -0.031  -0.150**  -0.153***    -
Age        
    20-21    -0.055 -0.070  0.082***  -0.103* -0.087*** -0.109*  -0.000 
    22-29    -0.069*** -0.183* -0.091***  -0.182** -0.208** -0.021  -0.032 
    30-39     0.282**  0.040  0.024    0.041  0.040  0.050   0.017 
    40-49     0.280**  0.221**  0.113*    0.417**  0.022  0.101*   0.123* 
    50-59     0.299**  0.030  0.150*    0.509**  0.000  0.070***   0.098*** 
    60-64     0.094  0.068  0.045    0.208**  0.074  0.000   0.065 
    65 and above     0.077  0.096***  0.000    0.208**  0.150**  0.020   0.215** 
Number of children    -0.012 -0.000 -0.000   -0.000 -0.000 -0.028  -0.022 
Job Tenure        
    2 to less than 5 years    -0.074  -0.052 -0.044   -0.057 -0.000 -0.030  -0.053 
    5 to less than 10 years    -0.020  -0.158** -0.040   -0.398** -0.028 -0.051  -0.225** 
    10 years or more     -0.104***  -0.189** -0.044   -0.048 -0.031 -0.344**  -0.188** 
Supervisory responsibility     0.241**   0.269**  0.306**    0.011  0.027  0.177**   0.271** 
Weekly Pay     0.002   0.000  0.000    0.008  0.014  0.007   0.001 
Establishment level        
     Number of employees    -0.000   -0.000 -0.000   -0.003 -0.000 -0.000  -0.000 
     High involvement    -0.032   -0.000 -0.000   -0.000 -0.009 -0.070  -0.042 
     Family friendly policies    -0.000   -0.000 -0.000   -0.071 -0.000 -0.000  -0.000 
     Job design     0.000    0.000  0.008    0.000  0.000  0.000   0.031 
Unemployment rate-1)     0.143**    0.130*  0.125*    0.152**  0.140*  0.155**   0.151** 
CD test     [0.00]    [0.00]  [0.00]    [0.00]  [0.00]  [0.00]   [0.00] 
R-squared adjustd     0.68    0.72  0.70    0.67  0.73  0.65   0.76 
Log Likelihood   -1525.48  -15.40.85 -1539.73  -1552.18 -1579.30 -1620.41 -1658.74 
Hausman test    [0.46]   [0.49]  [0.44]   [0.42]  [0.49]  [0.53]  [0.58] 










6    Conclusion 
Unemployment has been sidelined in the employee loyalty literature. Existing work has relied 
mostly on psychological contract and social exchange based explanations. Through the 
Shapiro and Stiglitz theoretical framework, it was argued that higher unemployment increases 
the cost of job loss, which has a positive effect on employee loyalty. Unemployment 
heightens feelings of job insecurity and has a direct effect on how employees perceive their 
current employment state to be.   
The empirical analysis investigated two primary hypotheses: i) whether high 
unemployment affects positively organizational commitment attitudes and ii) whether the 
effect of unemployment on such commitments differs across different types of organizations 
and industrial sectors. Through the employment of a large dataset of survey data from the 
Australian manufacturing sector, the findings documented that in relevance to the first 
hypothesis, regions characterized by higher unemployment rates have a stronger impact on 
loyalty commitments across employees, thus, providing solid supportive evidence to the first 
hypothesis tested. With respect to the second hypothesis, the results illustrated that 
unemployment retained its positive impact on employee loyalty, while the findings gain 
stronger power primarily for those working in public and in private limited companies and for 
the time span 2013-2014 in which Australian labor markets suffered from higher 
unemployment rates. 
While many of the internal drivers of loyalty can be shaped by the organization, other 
factors, such as unemployment, are largely outside the control of the organization. 
Organizations should take a closer look at the reasons why individuals are loyal to them. 
Whilst some feel attached towards their organization, because of a supportive work 
environment, others may choose to be loyal because they fear the negative consequences of 
becoming unemployed.  
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